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Introduction
Europe has always been a hub of international migration. In 2010, almost seven out of a hundred residents in the EU were born outside the EU, and additional three were born in a different member state than the current state of residence.
1 The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union and the extension of EU's internal market, including the freedom of movement of workers 2 , to the new member states from
Central and Eastern Europe changed the migration landscape in Europe tremendously. These enlargements abolished the barriers that precluded East-West migration flows during the Cold War, and created an internal labor market for the total population of about half a billion people, cross-cutting boundaries of member states with disparate level of economic development, wages, unemployment rates, and labor market institutions. 3 Unsurprisingly, these differences lead to significant migration flows mainly (but not exclusively)
in the east-west direction. These new migrant flows have not been unanimously welcome in the receiving countries, and immigration from Central and Eastern Europe was one of the pivotal arguments in the debate about UK's leaving the European Union, commonly known as "Brexit".
The scale of these flows was indeed remarkable, with about five and half million citizens of the new member states (EU12) living in the pre-enlargement member states (EU15 4 ) in 2010, which constitutes an increase by three and half million, or the factor of 2.5, over just six years. 5 As this large-scale policy experiment can certainly provide a number of interesting insights into the labor market effects of migration, quite naturally a significant body of literature studying the repercussions of such migration flows mainly for the receiving but also the sending labor markets has emerged. 6 This literature has mainly looked at the effects on wages, employment and unemployment, and welfare take up in individual member states separately. Generally speaking, besides some local effects, the available evidence is that the receiving labor markets absorbed 1 Own calculations based on the data collected and described in the data section below. 2 All nationals of EU member states as well as their family members enjoy the right of free movement in the EU as stipulated by the Treaty on the European Union, Directive 2004/38/EC, and the Case Law of the European Court of Justice if they do not pose an undue burden for the host member state's public funds and they possess comprehensive health insurance. 3 This inevitably lead to some anxieties which resulted in transitional arrangements allowing member states to open their labor markets gradually and within up to 7 years after the accession of new member states. See Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2010) and Palmer and Pytlikova (2015) . 4 EU15 refers to the fifteen pre-2004 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (referred to as EU10) joined the EU in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania (denoted EU2) joined in 2007, and Croatia was the most recent addition to the EU in 2013. EU8 refers to EU10 minus Cyprus and Malta. EU27 includes EU15, EU10 and EU2. 5 Calculations based on the own data collection efforts, the data is described in the section below. For other sources of estimates for earlier years see also Kahanec, 2013, and Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2016 . This evidence may however mask broader consequences of post-enlargement mobility. Migration in general facilitates cross-border social and economic ties, leading to an increased mobility of ideas and technologies, capital, and goods and services and thus a better allocation of production factors and improved total factor productivity, as well as gains from trade. 7 Although inherently difficult to detect, such effects may significantly affect EU member states, and thus their measurement is important for the debate about EU's migration policy.
The aim of this study is to analyze the effects of recent east-west mobility on economic outcomes across the EU and in the EU as a whole. Using an empirical model accounting for the problem of endogeneity of migration flows, we look at a range of indicators, in particular at GDP per capita, employment rates, capital stock and total factor productivity (TFP). The analysis is based on a rich dataset on immigration flows and stocks of foreigners, which has been collected by writing to selected national statistical offices, for 42 destination countries from virtually all source countries from around the globe for the years 1980-2010. 8 We comparatively evaluate the effects of post-enlargement intra-EU mobility (after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements) and immigration from the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries on a subsample consisting of EU destination countries.
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The main contribution of this study is twofold. First, the massive post-enlargement migration flows over a relatively short period of time offer a unique framework that is worth exploring to inform the academic debate about the broader economic effects of migration and migration policy. Second, a comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of mobility under various migration regimes is much needed in view of the heated policy debates surrounding migration policy in the EU. This agenda has become ever more urgent in view of EU's plans to upgrade mobility frameworks within its Eastern Partnership program and an increased migration potential in some of the key source countries as a consequence of the recent events in EU's neighborhood including the Arab Spring events, the Syrian civil war of the 2010s, and the Ukrainian crisis that started in 2014.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to our study. Section 3 describes shortly the novel international migration database and other 4 variables important for our analyses and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents an empirical model on the impact of immigration on destination country economy, on which we base our analysis, and our identification strategy. We discuss results of econometric analyses in in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides a discussion of future steps in our research.
Literature review
The effects of immigration on receiving countries has been a much debated issue in economics for a long time. Early theoretical models on the effects of labor mobility considered immigration in an extended version of the traditional Solow-Swan model, where immigrants are assumed to increase country's unskilled population, which ceteris paribus leads to a lower per capita income because of a reduction in capital. Benhabib (1996) relaxes the assumption of the Solow-Swan model that immigrants do not provide any capital, which leads to some economic gain from immigration in terms of per capita GDP. Borjas (1995) argues that immigrants increase labor endowment in receiving countries and the new internal equilibrium is then characterized by lower national wage and higher employment and national income. The difference with respect to the initial equilibrium is the so called "immigrants surplus" (Borjas, 1995) . A study by Hanson (2008) analyzes welfare consequences of immigration by assuming heterogeneity of workers in terms of skills, and perfect substitutability between native and foreign-born workers. The author shows that when low-skilled workers are allowed to freely move between countries, there will be migration from low-wage countries to high-wage countries until the wages will equalize. In the receiving country home-born unskilled workers lose while the native high-skilled workers win in terms of surplus. Thus, so far the theory says that the effect of migration depends on the type and selectivity of immigrants. Besides substitutability or complementarity of immigrant and native labor, capital endowments play an important role: if the physical capital endowment provided by immigrants is lower than the average native capital endowment the effect of immigration will be negative in terms of per capita GDP. From the empirical point of view the question of immigration's economic impacts is thus still open.
Most of the existing empirical papers examine the impact of immigration by focusing only on labor market implications and on one or only a few receiving countries (e.g. Aydemir and Borjas, 2007; Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2008; Manacorda et al., 2012 Peri (2012) analyzes the effects of immigration on each input of production function and on total factor productivity (TFP) for U.S. states' economies. The author also discusses the potential endogeneity problem, which he solves by using the instrumental variable (IV) technique, with past settlement patterns of immigrants driven by proximity to the border as an instrument for gross migration rates. In particular he
shows that an increasing immigration leads to: (i) no crowding out of employment of natives, (ii) an increasing TFP growth. Felbermayr, Hiller and Sala (2010) investigate the effect of immigrants (by using the stock of immigrants in destination country) on per capita GDP in the host countries. Using an IV cross-section approach and controlling for institutional quality and trade and financial openness, they find a positive effect of immigration on per capita GDP: a 10% increase in the migrants stock leads to a 2.2% increase in per capita GDP. Similarly Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Prarolo (2013) find that the share of foreigners in total population has a positive effect of per capita GDP in EU destination regions.
Further, Peri (2007) ) and let the immigrants to do the manual tasks (Peri and Sparber, 2009 ). This finding is consistent with other immigration studies that show immigration does not crowd out natives, but in fact it has a positive effect on employment and investment (Ortega and Peri, 2009; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010) , while total factor productivity is increased by optimizing the task specialization and by encouraging the adoption of unskilled-efficient technologies (Peri 2012) .
In an earlier paper, Peri (2006) argues that although immigration increases employment for the natives with complementary skills, it has a negative effect on those with substitutable skills. Previous research also shows that immigrants are substitutes for work performed by migrants that came in earlier migration waves. In particular, using data from different countries and different econometric methods, they find that immigration increases the overall wages for natives in the host country, but reduces the wages of previous immigrants (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; D'Armuri et al., 2010 , Docquier et al., 2013 , Longhi et al., 2010 . A recent study by Foged and Peri (2016) , however, shows that even if immigrants may be imperfect substitutes to low-skilled workers, they still improve their labor market position. The reason is that, as a reaction to the migrant inflow, low-skilled native workers moved to complementary job market areas and started to 6 specialize in non-manual skills. This leads to an increase in their wages and employment opportunities (Foged and Peri, 2016) . However, in contrast to the hypothesis of imperfect substitutability of immigrants and natives, Docquier et al (2013) find that immigration increases wages, on average, it has a negative effect for highly educated workers (except for US) and a positive effect for the wages of low-skilled workers.
From other outcome variables, it is worth mentioning that immigration appears to have a positive effect on trade creation, by reducing the fixed costs of trade, through the network effects and stimulates the trade of differentiated products (Peri and Requena, 2010 ) and on foreign direct investment (Javorcik et al. 2011; Gormsen and Pytlikova, 2012) . The effect on services is also positive, in the sense that it decreases the prices for low-skilled services (e.g. gardening, house-cleaning), which benefits the natives (Longhi et al, 2010) .
Regarding the effects of immigration on education, some previous studies suggest that the increase in the number of foreign students has a negative effect on the education of natives, while it increases the knowledge creation for universities (Hanson, 2008; Kato and Sparber, 2013) . Using a panel of EU member
states, industries and skill-groups, Guzi, Kahanec, and Mýtna-Kureková (2015), document that immigrants are more responsive to labor and skill shortages than the natives, contributing to economic effiiency in the receiving countries. Kahanec and Zimmermann (2014) argue that immigration tends to reduce income inequality.
When it comes to the effects of post-enlargement migration on receiving countries, the consensus in the literature appears to be that of very limited if any effects on wages or unemployment rates (see Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010, 2016; Gilpin et al., 2006; Blanchflower, Saleheen, and Shadforth, 2007; Lemos and Portes, 2008) . Doyle, Hughes, and Wadensjö (2006), Hughes (2007) and Barrett (2010) report that even in Ireland, with the highest relative inflows from the new member states, effects on aggregate unemployment rate could not be detected, although some substitution might have occurred. Brenke, Yuksel, and Zimmermann (2010) point at competition for low-skilled jobs between EU8 migrants and immigrants from outside of Europe. Similarly, Blanchflower and Lawton (2010) report some substitution in low skilled sectors.
Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) 
Data description
The dataset on international migration used for the analyses has been collected by Mariola Pytlikova and encompasses information on bilateral flows and stocks of immigrants from all world source countries in 42 destination countries over the period 1980-2010. 12 The dataset has been collected by requesting detailed information on migration inflows and foreign population stocks by source country from selected national statistical offices in 27 countries. For six OECD countries -Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation and Turkey -the data comes from the OECD International Migration Database. For nine other destinationsBulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovenia -the data is collected from
Eurostat. For purposes of our analysis we focus on EU15 and EU27 as destination countries and the EU12 and EaP as sending countries, for a time period ranging from 1995 to 2010.
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The data covers annually both migration flows and foreign population stocks 14 and is more comprehensive with respect to destinations, origins and time due to our own effort with data gathering from particular statistical offices. For an overview of comprehensiveness of observations of flows and stocks across all EU27 destination countries over time, see the Appendix Table A1 and Table A2 , respectively. It is apparent that the data becomes more comprehensive over time and thus missing observations become less of a problem for more recent years.
In our dataset, as in the other existing datasets, different countries use different definitions of an "immigrant" Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith, 2008 , for a description of the dataset). For the study by Adsera and Pytlikova (2015), we extended the number of destinations to 30 OECD countries and the number of source countries to all world countries, and we extended the time period so that it covers years 1980-2010. This current dataset covering 42 destinations and years 1980-2010 has been used in Cai et al (2016) and it is thereafter referred as Pytlikova (2011) . 13 We chose the period from 1995 in order to avoid problems related to different country break-ups, such as countries of Former Yugoslavia and Former USSR. 14 Migration flow is the inflow of immigrants to a destination from a given origin in a given year. The definition usually covers immigrants coming for a period of half year or longer. Foreign population stock is a number of foreigners from a given country of origin living in a destination in a given year. The foreign population stock data is dated ultimo.
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the United Kingdom accounts an immigrant by self-reported nationality. Different definitions are in place also for immigrant stocks. While some countries report the first generation of immigrants, including the ones that have received citizenship (country of birth definition preferred in our data), other countries include in the immigrant population the second and third generation, excluding the naturalized ones (definition by citizenship or country of origin), see Pedersen et al. (2008) , Adsera and Pytlikova (2015) and Cai et al. (2016) for a more detailed discussion on the restrictions given by migration flows and migration stocks using the dataset. Appendix Tables A3 and A4 provide a detailed overview of definitions and sources of the data on migration inflows and immigrant stocks, respectively. The information on other economic and social factors for these countries has been collected from various sources, such as the World Bank, OECD, ILO, or IMF.
Descriptive statistics
Compared to other advanced economies labor mobility is relatively low in the European Union. Gill and Rasier (2012) report that the annual interstate mobility of working-age population in the EU15 was about 1% before the 2004 enlargement. The corresponding rate for the US was 3%, Australia and Canada 2%, and even the Russian Federation exhibited 1.7%. In southern Europe mobility rates are even lower at about 0.5% annually, whereas countries like France, Ireland, Netherlands or the UK report mobility rates around 2% (Bonin et al, 2008 ).
Most migration in Europe happens among EU member states; inflows from Eastern Partnership countries to the EU had been increasing before the onset of the Great Recession, but remain much below those from other source regions. Figure 1 describes migration flows into EU countries, by continent of source countries.
As it can be seen, the biggest migration flows come from Europe, followed by Asia and Africa. Source: Gross inflows. Own calculations using collected migration flows and stock database by Pytlikova (2011) Looking at the evolution of migration stocks by continents of origin, we may observe that migration trends follow closely the development in the migration flows. European countries provide the highest number of migrants, followed by Asia and Africa, see Figure 3 . Source: own calculations using collected migration flows and stock database by Pytlikova (2011) Similarly as in the case of immigrant flows, we divide the foreign population stocks stemming from Europe into more detailed regions of origin, see Figure 4 . We can observe that the highest number of migrants living in EU27 countries come originally from the "old" EU15 countries, and Norway, Iceland and Switzerland ("old" EEA/EFTA18), whereas foreigners stemming from the EaP countries have the lowest numbers. Still, it can be seen an upward trend, suggesting future increases in the stock of migrants from EaP countries. Transitional arrangements applied differently across the EU towards citizens of new member states and other factors such as linguistic proximity or labor market performance resulted in significant variation in terms of the intensity of migration flows across destination countries and in resulting stocks of foreign population.
Whereas as of 2010 the main target countries for EU8 citizens were the UK and Germany, relatively few of them live in Malta, Bulgaria or Slovenia, see Table 1 . Italy and Spain dominated as the most attractive destinations for the EU2 migrants, while at the other end of the range were mainly the EU8 countries.
Migrants from EaP countries predominantly live in Italy, Germany, but also Poland and the Czech Republic.
Countries such as Malta, Finland, Slovenia and the Netherlands are least popular destinations among the EaP migrants (see Table 1 ). We may observe that there was only a slight increase in the share of immigrants from the EaP countries in the EU destination, from 3.36 % to 3.58% immigrants from the EaP in total immigration in 1995 and 2010, respectively. Austria  165478  185535  46083  79990  5144  16571  1003399  1315512  Belgium  6972  58131  2909  39554  867  12853  909769  1057666  Bulgaria  1165  1093  195  183  4966  4502  25634  23838  Cyprus  1105  x  5816  x  2293  x  88640  150678  Czech Rep  75744  91830  6331  11483  49018  141475  159207  426423  Denmark  13010  42570  1803  11099  483  7969  249885  428904 Estonia  7029  x  63  x  40946  x  262826  217890  Finland  7941  31870  850  2769  68  1457  106303  248135  France  125377  120006  30164  64626  13239  46182  4308527  5342288  Germany  423263  680314  148103  201405  50718  192815  7173866  6753621  Greece  6772  2165  10373  55463  1177  47524  155453  621023  Hungary  8539  11249  70151  73930  4902  18021  139953  197819  Ireland  419  152452  738  12705  0  5906  251624  612169  Italy  29031  143759  27792  1019710  2092  346163  737793  4570317  Latvia  31333  27722  110  924  128575 110619  401974  343271  Lithuania  13499  15624  60  180  80110  81707  246609  222447  Luxembourg  1096  7118  468  2249  259  x  162285 The effects of immigrant inflows importantly depend on the skill composition of immigrant inflows. Although the data do not generally permit a detailed account of the variation in skill composition across destination countries, previous literature using micro-data indicates that migrants from the new EU member states appear to have been predominantly medium skilled, but with rather high proportions of high skilled individuals (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010; Brücker and Damelang, 2009 ). Brücker and Damelang (2009) report that the share of high skilled individuals was 27 percent among EU15 natives, 22 percent among EU8 immigrants, and 18 percent among EU2 immigrants. The corresponding figures for low-skilled migrants were 27, 17, and 29 percent. Although especially EU8 migrants appear to be relatively skilled, we should note that many of them worked in occupations below their level of formal education, which probably affected their impact on the labor market (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). As for the cross-country variation, Holland et al. (2011) report that Luxembourg, Demark, Sweden, and Ireland exhibit the highest shares of high-skilled workers from the new member states, whereas Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, and Finland disproportionally attracted their low-skilled colleagues. According to Kahanec (2012) migrants from the EaP 13 countries appear to have been the least educated of the three immigrant groups considered in this study, and have been similarly exposed to downskilling into lower skilled jobs.
Methodology
To determine the effects of immigration from new EU member states and from Eastern Partnership Countries on the receiving EU economies, we follow an aggregate production function framework, in part as in Peri (2012), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Docquier et al (2013) . The starting point of our analyses is the CobbDouglas production function:
Where Y represents the total output, K represents the physical capital input, L represents the labor input and A represents the total factor productivity. Parameter represents the capital income share. 15 Subscripts j and t indicate destination country and year, respectively. We use a logarithmic transformation of derivatives over time, and the linear form of equation (1) can be then written as:
Borrowing elements of growth theory, this model suggests that the growth rate of total output depends on the growth rate of the physical capital, the growth rate of the labor input and also the growth rate of the total factor productivity.
Using equation (1) the average wage in country c, at time t can be calculated as the marginal product of labor as follows:
Using the same transformation as in the case of equation (2), it follows that the percentage change in average wages depends on total factor productivity, but also on the capital-labor ratio and the labor growth rates:
where
the capital to labor ratio and jt y represents GDP per worker. Therefore, determining the effects that immigration has on wages and economic growth rate implies determining the effects it has on 15 As a standard in the literature, we assume = 0.33. total employment, physical capital, total factor productivity and the capital to labor ratio. In other words, it implies estimating the following set of models:
where X represents one of the following: employment rate and labour force participation (to account for the labor input), capital services and capital to labor ratio (to account for the capital input), total factor productivity (calculated as the Solow residual), output per worker (to account for the average wage) and output per capita. To capture other factors determining the economic outcomes of our interest that cannot be attributed to the changes in stock of foreigners per population, we account for country-specific time- We hypothesize that foreign population can affect the aggregate production of the receiving country. In particular we expect that, first, immigrants increase the total labor supply and may at the same time either crowd-out some natives or attract them into employment (especially if they provide jobs complementary to those of natives and stimulate productivity and specialization, or enable natives to enter the labor market by providing household services). We therefore estimate immigration's total effect on employment, which combines their direct contribution and the effect on native employment. Second, we expect immigration to affect investment, as marginal product of capital may be increased due to the increase in labour supply. In addition, depending on skill composition of immigrants, the effect on capital accumulation and capital intensity can be positive, as highly educated immigrants may work in more capital-intensive sectors, or may use capital-complementary techniques. On the other hand low-skilled immigrants can have a negative effect on capital, or leave it unaffected. Thus, the impact on capital accumulation and capital intensity in the short and long run depends on the composition of immigrants. Finally, immigrants may either give rise to crowding out effects given fixed factors of production (acting as substitutes) and/or they may add to the varieties of 16 The region dummies are defined in the following matter: Western European country group contains Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, UK and Ireland; Southern European country group contains Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta; Central and Eastern European country group contains the new EU 2004 and 2007 member countries excluding Malta and Cyprus; Nordic country group covers Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. ideas and products in the receiving economy (acting as complements); depending on which effect prevails, this may result in higher or lower total factor productivity.
Identification
A methodological problem that arises for the models described above is the problem of simultaneity or reverse causality. It may well be the case that immigration rates are influenced by the dependent variables (low employment, low GDP may trigger migration flows), and not the other way around. To deal with the potential endogeneity problems, we apply the instrumental variable (IV) technique in our analyses, in which identification of causal effects rests on the instrumental variable. To qualify for a good instrument, a variable has to meet two conditions. First, it must be uncorrelated with the error term of the structural model and, second, it must be correlated with the endogenous variable.
As an instrument we use the predicted foreign population rates, using a model of determinants of bilateral migration in order to obtain predicted stocks of migrants. In our two-stage strategy, the first-stage model of migration determinants has the following form:
where ijt s stands for the share of foreign population originating from country i and living in country j at time t. On the right hand side we include an interaction of origin country fixed effects and time dummies,  i  t , to account for any economic, demographic or social changes in origin countries in each year and a set of bilateral country-pair specific effects, ij  . Based on the model we predict foreign population stocks, which are then summed by each destination country and adjusted for the population size of each particular destination country. The resulting variable is used as an instrument for the structural equation in the second stage.
Hence, for our identification strategy we assume that development in home countries represented by the interaction of the origin country dummies and time is uncorrelated with economic conditions in destination countries (with our dependent variables we use in the second step), and at the same time those push factors represent strong predictors of international migration (Adsera and Pytlikova, 2015; Palmer and Pytlikova, 2015) .
Results
The results of our analyses of the effect of immigration on the EU15 and EU27 destination countries are presented in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. We report each model estimated by the OLS method with country fixed effects and by the IV technique, which accounts for possible endogeneity of migration flows. The rows correspond to models with the employment rate and labour force participation (to account for the labor input), capital services and capital to labor ratio (to account for the capital input), total factor productivity (calculated as the Solow residual), output per worker (to account for the average wage) and output per capita as dependent variables. To account for possible differences across immigrant categories, as defined by their origins, we distinguish the results for foreigners stemming from the 2004 EU entrants, 2007 EU entrants, and EaP countries.
A number of notable results emerge. Whereas fixed-effects models generally produce insignificant results, relatively small, but negative and statistically significant, effects on GDP, GDP per capita, capital-to-labor ratio, and output per worker emerge for immigration from the EaP countries. Due to possible endogeneity of migration flows, our preferred specification is the IV model. In IV regressions, we observe statistically significant positive effect of immigration from the new EU countries on GDP and GDP per capita in the EU15 destination countries, whereas the coefficient to the immigrants coming from EaP is negative. The estimated effect on GDP per capita is quite large as the coefficients imply that 10 percent increase in the number of No statistically significant results emerge in the IV models for the effects on total factor productivity. The same applies to the impacts on capital stock and capital-to-labor ratio for immigration from the new EU member states; however, for immigrants from the EaP countries a small negative effect on capital stock and a positive impact on capital-to-labor ratio emerge as statistically significant. Interestingly, the latter result contradicts the one found in the FE model, indicating that countries with increasing capital-to-labor ratio might be substituting capital for immigrant labor from the EaP countries. Finally, negative effects on output per worker are found for immigrants from new EU member states, but the corresponding results for those from EaP countries are insignificant.
In the next step, we run similar analyses using immigration to EU27 countries. It turns out that the results are generally very similar to those estimated for the EU15 countries, except that the coefficients are, as a rule, estimated less precisely. This indicates that the results we observe are primarily driven by the EU15 countries. This is not surprising, given that immigration to the EU15 is considerably larger and has a longer history than migration flows to the rest of the EU Table 1 : Consequences of foreign population on production factors, productivity and factors per worker in the EU15 economies: yearly changes, FE and IV estimates. Period of analyses: 1995 Period of analyses: -2010 .
Notes: Each cell shows the coefficient from a different regression with the dependent variable described in the first cell of the row and the explanatory variable equal to the total flow of immigrants as a share of the initial population of the receiving country. All regressions includes year, country fixed effects and interaction of region dummy and time. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The 2SLS estimation method uses the predicted flow of immigrants from the gravity push factors as instruments, in particular we use (xi: xtreg lnflowstocks i.from*i.year, fe)model: ln(sijt)=a+b(country FE*year)+v(country FE); the predicted share of foreign population per destination population are then summed on the destination country level and used as an IV. ***,**,* imply significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Notes: Each cell shows the coefficient from a separate regression with the dependent variable described in the first cell of the row and the explanatory variable equal to the total flow of immigrants as a share of the initial population of the receiving country. All regressions includes year, country fixed effects and interaction of region dummy and time. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The 2SLS estimation method uses the predicted flow of immigrants from the gravity push factors as instruments, in particular we use (xi: xtreg lnstocksperpop i.from*i.year, fe)model: ln(sijt)=a+b(country FE*year)+v(country FE); the predicted share of foreign population per destination population are then summed on the destination country level and used as an IV. ***,**,* imply significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
Conclusions
In this study we contribute to the literature on destination-country consequences of international migration.
In particular we look at the effects of immigration from the new EU member states and Eastern Partnership countries on the EU -separately for old EU member states (EU15) and on the EU as a whole (EU27) -over the years 1995-2010. Taking into account possible reverse causality from economic indicators to migration flows, our results show positive and significant effects of post-enlargement migration flows from the new EU member states on GDP, GDP per capita, and employment rate and negative effect on output per worker.
Regarding immigration from EaP countries, we find small but statistically significant negative effects on GDP, GDP per capita, employment rate, and capital stock, but a positive significant effect on capital-to-labor ratio, in EU countries.
Our results for intra-EU mobility are in line with the previous literature; complementing it by showing that the generally neutral-to-positive positive effects found at the micro level, or at various levels of aggregation, also show up at the macro, EU-wide, level, and for a number of, but not all, economic indicators. On the other hand, small negative effects are found for immigration from EaP origins. Further research is needed to better understand why EaP immigration differs from mobility from new EU member states. Besides the possibility that this difference emerges due to different composition of immigrant inflows from the two clusters of origins, an alternative hypothesis is that it is an artifact of different legal status of immigrants from new EU member states and those from EaP countries. One plausible explanation is that free labor mobility contributes to the positive effects of intra-EU migration on the receiving countries by enabling immigrants to allocate and integrate more efficiently. As a corollary, it may well be that legal barriers to immigration from the EaP and their integration hamper positive economic effects of their immigration.
These findings underscore the positive economic effects of intra-EU mobility as a pillar of economic efficiency of the single market in the EU, and provide an economic argument for eliminating, or at least reducing, barriers to labor mobility and immigrant integration. 
